

# OFFICIAL DISPATCH

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DISPATCH NO.

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CLASSIFICATION

21 February 1951

TO Chief of Station, Karlsruhe  
Attn: MCB  
FROM Chief, Foreign Division S  
Chief, Foreign Division M  
SUBJECT GENERAL  
SPECIFIC Operational/REDBIRD  
Plans for Project AERODYNAMIC for Spring 1951  
Ref: MEM-A 1/55

RIP/AR  
20-70 2/48  
[ ] [ ] [ ]

1. The progress reports on this Project from Munich are excellent. Presented below are plans and comments on some of the major operation facets and problems innate in this Project. The bulk of the suggestions below were hammered out in conferences with CARTHAGE 3, CASSOWARIES 2 and 3, [ ] and [ ]. The undersigned has tried to inject into the spring 1951 plan all valid conclusions derived from our experience to date in this and the CAPSTAN operations. Since this memorandum is restricted in the main to the immediate operational problems facing us in the mounting of the first team drop and the follow-up implementation of communications and further drops, separate memoranda are in preparation on the following subjects: the extent of FJ Cape participation and plans, the debriefing of CARTHAGE 3 on subjects relating to the Ukrainian underground and the debriefing results from the same source on operational intelligence questions.

## Composition of the Teams

2. The first normal drop team will be composed of CARTHAGE 9, CASSOWARY 5, CARTHAGE 7 and CARTHAGE 13. The second normal drop team will be composed of CARTHAGE 3, CARTHAGE 14, and CARTHAGES 11 and 12. For use in the event that the plans outlined below require modification an emergency drop team may be formed using CARTHAGE 3, 14 and 5.

## Dispatch of the First Team

3. This drop will take place during the May 1951 moon phase. CARTHAGE 3 has stated that reception parties will be waiting at the proper spots during May. The team will only jump if the plane crew sees the reception party signals. In the past our teams did not have the benefit of a reception party, and it required more than a month for the team leaders to arrive at CAMPORE headquarters after landing. How much time it will take the next team to get to headquarters with the assistance of the reception party can only be guessed. CARTHAGE 3's best guess is two to three weeks. Nevertheless, we shall expect the drop team

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to communicate via w/t within a maximum of two weeks after their landing. If no signals from the ground reception committee are seen, the first team will return to Germany with the plane and as soon as possible the emergency team composed of CARTHAGE 3 and two escorts will parachute "blind" into the Zakarpatskaya Oblast with a minimum of communications equipment. This is necessary, according to CARTHAGE 3, because the lack of a reception committee at both drop points can only have one meaning: the underground is so hard-pressed that it is unable to fulfill its own plan.

a. CAMPFIRE Security Measures: It is clear from what CARTHAGE 3 has told the undersigned to date that all possible security precautions have been taken in the Ukraine to ensure the success of the first spring drop. For example:

- i. the Voice of America signals were known only to CAMPFIRE 6 and one other man when CARTHAGE 3 left the Ukraine last September.
- ii. the persons selected to head the three to five man reception parties at one or both drop points were CARTHAGE 2 and 4.
- iii. since CARTHAGE 3 knew the ground-to-air signals pre-established for the 1950 resupply drop, CARTHAGE 3 arranged for and worked out new signals, thus sidestepping the possibility of Soviet provocation. These new signals were imparted to CAMPFIRE 6 who was to brief CARTHAGES 2 and 4 at his discretion.
- iv. the reception party (or parties) will have well-devised direct courier or dead-letter-drop communication with CAMPFIRE headquarters so that, ideally, little or no contact with other partisans or civilians will be necessary.

b. Pre-Drop Signals: In order to inform CAMPFIRE that a drop is actually in the offing, innocent text signals for broadcast over the Voice of American Ukrainian programs were devised by CAMPFIRE 6 and included in the briefing of CARTHAGE 3 for relay to case officers in Germany. Short talks on specified facets of Ukrainian cultural history comprise the signals. The first signal indicating the safe arrival of CARTHAGE 3 was successfully incorporated into a VOA program in early January and February. For reasons of security it is not felt advisable to give a complete description of this code here. In brief, however, the following messages will be conveyed over VOA prior to the next drop:

- i. indication that a personnel drop will be made.
- ii. indication that supplies will also be dropped.
- iii. ~~Special~~ confirmation signal that an air drop is scheduled (included in case signal "i" was not heard by the underground).

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Although precise dates are listed for the broadcast of these signals, the signals themselves do not indicate the date or place of the drop. The drop points are pre-established and CAMPBELL realizes that the date of the drop will depend on weather and the correct phase and position of the moon. All agreed that May will be first month when these prerequisites can all be met.

c. Drop Sites and Their Security: Two drop sites were chosen in the Ukraine and relayed by CARTAGE 3 to case officers in Washington. The only available air reconnaissance photographs of one of these areas are already in Munich. If such photos of the second point are also available in Washington, they will be forwarded to the field. To minimize the chances of a security breach, [ ] was briefed verbally on the location of the drop sites so that the number of persons who know the location of these sites can be kept to the minimum required by operational necessity.

[ ] should keep a list of the persons who are aware of the location of the drop points and the actual date on which the operation will be run off. Should the aircraft fail to return from its mission it will be difficult for the case officer in the field to say with any confidence that a security breach on this end was impossible, unless he keeps accurate count of the number of persons who have knowledge of the crucial operational data. To date only CARTAGE 3, CASSOWARY 2, the undersigned and [ ] know the drop sites. This security factor should also be stressed from the outset to those members of Gen. Lende's staff who will necessarily become familiar with the essential facts of the operation. If a serious security breach takes place outside, it is quite possible that the Ukrainian underground members in the reception party will feel the most immediate effects. It is also quite logical that the willingness of the Ukrainian underground to cooperate with the AIS could be grievously impaired by a security blow-up traceable to Germany or Washington. CAMPBELL 6 is keeping close tabs on who knows what about the operation inside the Ukraine, according to CARTAGE 3. The explicitness with which CAMPBELL 6 requested that a thorough CE investigation of the twice-dispatched air freight demonstrates an understanding seriousness on security matters which we must respect. In a time of crisis, a critical misunderstanding could arise between the Ukrainian underground and the AIS, if the AIS can successfully dupes either partner in this Project into believing that the other partner has had security or is penetrated.

d. The Reception Party: No reception party is scheduled to wait at the drop points until the moon period of May 1951. Conditions for clandestine movement are always favorable in the second half of May and it is mainly for this reason that CAMPBELL officials selected the last moon period before their annual policy conference which takes place in June. It is not known if reception parties will include personnel in addition to CARTAGES 2 and 4.

e. Reconnaissance Ground to Air Signals: CARTAGE 3 has arranged that the leader of the reception committee will stand in the middle of the drop site with a flashlight which he will use to indicate his position and the direction of the wind, if any. The signal used to give the direction of the wind is as follows: the signaler will stand with his back to the

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wind, will hold his flashlight at arm's length above his head, will turn the flashlight on and swing it forward until the arm is at right angles to the body. When the arm is at right angles in front of the body, the light is extinguished while the arm swings back to the starting position above the signaler's head. After swinging the arm forward three times, the signaler, swings the lighted flashlight in a circle above his head three times. This signal is repeated, three forward motions of the arm followed by three circles until the plane is overhead discharging passengers and freight. Test this signal in Germany to ascertain from what altitude and distance this signal can be seen. This test is suitable for inclusion on one of the night problems for the air crew.

2. If No Signals are Seen on the Ground: CARTHAGE 3 is decidedly of the conviction that if the proper signals from the ground are not seen, the first team should not jump but should return to Germany. In such an eventuality, CARTHAGE 3 has himself offered to jump "blind" into the Zakarpatskaya Oblast with two other men and radio sets forty-eight hours after the return of the first flight or as soon thereafter as weather permits. CARTHAGE 3 reasons with some logic that he personally would be the best qualified of the CARTHAGES to go in and clarify the situation inside, because he is now quite adept at getting back out. We concur that he is the logical man to head an emergency drop team (a) if the first team does not jump because no reception party is there and (b) if the drop of the first team plus an emergency supply drop are both failures.

In the Event the First Team Achieves W/t Contact

4. If the first normal team establishes w/t communications, then subsequent operations will depend largely on instructions from the underground. However, we must assume that they will require either a supply or personnel drop in the following moon period. In general, as long as we are limited to moon periods for drops, we do not want to pass up any moon period without a drop. We also want to make at least one package and/or personnel air pick-up during 1951.

Concerning the feasibility of air drops in general, CARTHAGE 3 has made several very pertinent and clairvoyant comments, clairvoyant in the sense that he has foreseen one danger inherent in frequent supply and personnel drops which apparently had not occurred to CAMPORE 6 and colleagues up to the end of summer 1950 when CARTHAGE 3 left for Germany. Large-scale air drops will inevitably come to the attention of the Soviets who might well deploy whole armies of security troops in an unparalleled seige of carnage, genocide and terrorism in the Western Ukraine which would inevitably defeat the purpose for which the supplies were sent and, indeed, the whole purpose of Project ARKADYANNE. CARTHAGE 3 comments that if the underground deems that its own thinned-out cadres of partisans are at stake, it will not request any large or frequent deliveries of supplies until the actual outbreak of hostilities. The loss of some half-dozen lives as the direct result of CARTHAGE 8's capture (CARTHAGE 6, PIDKOVA, VIRNOVY, etc.) has given CAMPORE a more realistic picture of what happens when an air drop is compromised. Soviet activity since May 1950 and following the first 1951 air drop are the presently-unassessable factors which the underground will undoubtedly weigh carefully before asking for a supply drop of non-communications

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equipment. That is all we can say at the present time about what can be expected in the way of air drops if the first normal team is successful.

5. If the first normal drop team jumps to a reception committee but is not heard from within a reasonable length of time, then we will proceed with an emergency resupply drop in the ensuing moon period. Failure to come up on the air can mean that the team has been captured or otherwise destroyed, but non-appearance on V/U can also mean, as it did in the first two drops, that the radio equipment is defective or lost. Therefore an emergency supply drop plan should be worked out with the first team and the same system of split briefing used for May 1950 should be employed. Freight would actually be dropped only if signals from a reception party were seen. It goes without saying, however, that if plane crews on the personnel drop encounter unusual counter measures, such as fighter planes, the feasibility of an emergency resupply drop must be reconsidered.

If the emergency drop team is sent and does not come on the air within a reasonable period of time, then the first normal team, which went in and returned on the first flight, will be equipped and sent for a "blind" drop into a suitable site in Dnepropetrovsk, Stanislavov or Lvov Galicia with a minimum of equipment and documented for a period of existence independent of the underground during which they would attempt to determine the extent to which Soviet counter measures had destroyed the underground's ability to function effectively. After having either made contact with whatever remnants of the underground still exist, or having established that the organization has been thoroughly liquidated, the team will attempt infiltration to Germany with a detailed report of the new situation. It will be upon this report that we will base plans for further operations in 1951 and in 1952.

#### Recommendations

6. The field's decision (para 1, MFM-A 4883) to solve the supply and training for all eight men at once is practical because stockpiling in the field and equipping and training platoon-fashion are the only efficient ways in which the field can avoid last-minute "flaps" resulting from delay in shipment arrivals from Washington and team personnel substitutions. If the emergency team (GARTHMAN 3 and two escorts) is used, then rapid substitutions and re-equipping is essential.

a. Weapons: There are in actuality only about three different machine-plated type weapons with which we can arm our couriers now and for the foreseeable future. In order of their availability they are: the American M-2 carbine 30 calibre fully-automatic with folding stock; the German MP 1942 and 1943 (also called Schneidmesser); and the Russian-made PTS and PTSb. With the first, there are three drawbacks: the security factor, the small magazine which holds only fifteen shots, the lack of proper ammunition in the Ukraine. With the second there are two primary disadvantages: the lack of adequate supplies of proper ammunition in the Ukraine and the comparatively great weight of the weapon and the ammunition. With the third type, there is one decisive and one minor drawback. The decisive drawback is that it has been very difficult for a number of reasons to get

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arms from Korea. The minor drawback is psychological: the Ukrainian partisans do not favor these weapons because the Soviet security troops are not particularly afraid of their fire power and accuracy. The following action has been taken in Washington to provide sufficient weapons for this operation:

- i. 50 German "Schmeisser" machine pistols with six magazines and 500 rounds each have been ordered from our warehouse.
- ii. 30 American M-2 carbines with six clips each and 800 rounds of ammunition each have been ordered.
- iii. We will transship MOB's share of weapons from Korea.
- iv. 100 phosphorous grenades have been ordered.
- v. 25 small pistols with 5 clips each and 500 rounds of ammunition each have been ordered.

b. Clothing: According to CASSOWARY 3, the first normal team's members will not all be dressed in immaculate, tailor-made partisan garb as in the past, but will be dressed differently in keeping with the diverse situations the team may encounter. It is our understanding that two men will wear partisan-type uniforms, the third will wear civilian clothes, whereas the fourth will be dressed as a Soviet army officer. This appears to be a very sensible plan, since now there are two members of the team, the "civilian" and the "officer," who conceivably could contact civilians for help without attracting undue attention. It is recommended that the clothing and boots worn by future personnel in partisan garb be soiled, superficially at least, so that the cleanliness of the wearer will not differ from that of other partisans. It is also suggested that the two partisan members of the first team do not shave for a day or so prior to the drop, if this will not disrupt the security pattern at the air base. At any rate our boys will not look like partisans on parade this year. We are attempting on this end to get CARRHAGE 3 some suitable Soviet clothing to wear so that the field will be relieved of this one problem.

c. Concentrated Foods: Regarding the concentrated rations, the following items have been ordered for delivery to NAT prior to 1 April 1951:

210 blocks of pemican  
2100 dextrose tablets  
210 D-ration chocolate bars  
500 multi-vitamin pills  
700 bouillon cubes

As soon as we have a shipment of cargo number on these items we will forward it to you by cable, giving the ETA at Karlsruhe.

There are no such things as concentrated food pills or tablets at this time, although a research and development branch of the Defense Department is trying to devise something along this line. Pemican blocks

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about one inch thick, one-and-one-half inches wide and two inches long have been developed for inclusion in the survival kits for downed American airmen. [ ] and CANNIBALS have unchewed on one of these blocks and believe that if a person were hungry enough he could eat it. These pandemon blocks represent the most highly concentrated food now available. The block has a high fat content since it was devised primarily for survival under Arctic or semi-Arctic conditions. Allegedly it takes one or two days for the human stomach to become accustomed to this diet, but it must be added in defense of the invention that the block contains all the minerals, vitamins, etc. which the human body requires. The worst part, of course, supplements his diet with copious quantities of water. Each pandemon block is wrapped in aluminum foil and the item is stowable to the extent that there are no trademarks or any writing on the wrapper or the product.

With the exception of benzodrine pills, dextrose tablets provide the greatest energy to the user. Such tablets were supplied to CANNIBALS 1 and 2. They can be chewed up or used as sweetening in beverages.

The Dextalon concentrated chocolate block is feasible to emergency use who served in the American Infantry. One such block provides enough nutrition for three meals. Natural Flour has been added with this chocolate so that it will not melt as readily as normal chocolate. For purposes of good digestion not more than one or two ounces of this chocolate should be eaten at any one time. As far as the undersigned knows, there are no particular vitamins added to this chocolate.

The vitamin pills are actually non-essential items and it is up to the case officers and the CASSOWARIES to decide whether they should be sent with the couriers. At any rate the field will have them on hand.

The pandemon cubes may pose a security problem if each cube is marked in English. It might be valuable for the case officer at HQ to examine pandemon cubes manufactured in Germany to see if they are storable. We assume that the couriers will request the usual inland and hard candies for inclusion in the food supply. Since such items can be procured locally in Germany we have not ordered them here.

4. Map, Contingency: Concerning your request for suitable map coverage of the general route area used to date from the directive to the general area of Vienna, we have decided that if the GSSB-4436 series is to be used the individual maps must be photographed in reduced size in order to be carried conveniently. A sample photographic reduction of the Furber sheet was still legible although it was only sixteen inches long. We estimate preparing not only reduced size reproductions of the GSSB-4436 series but also reduced size reproductions of the 1:250000 series of the same area and you can take your pick since both sets will be forwarded to you. We are also including a map of Vienna of 1:25000. At this date our map service is not able to reproduce maps on silk or cloth. Therefore some type of photographic paper will have to be used. We intend to pick the thinnest paper possible and back the sheets up with gauge-44s cloth so that the whole business can be folded up like a normal road map.

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We are not, as in the past, equipping our first team for a blind drop. If the first team is to jump only upon signals from a reception party on the ground, more supplies can be sent with this team than four men would be able to handle alone. Therefore whether all material is attached to the personnel parachute bag or whether a separate freight pack is dropped will depend in part on whether or not sufficient supplies can be efficiently packed into the parachute bags. If there are more than four persons to dispose of the freight, more freight than four people can handle on the ground can be sent. For the purpose of analysis, any piece of equipment which is not vital to (a) the establishment of communications, or (b) the survival and movement of the team must be termed non-essential. Extra clothing, extra ammunition and arms, extra radio sets (two would appear to be the basic minimum) etc. are, for example, non-essential. Enough food to share with the reception party on the ground for several days is on the other hand an essential. If all equipment, essential and non-essential, is worn on or attached to the bodies of team members, each man may be a fairly ungainly object to get out of the plane if he is weighed down with over 75 pounds of bulky equipment. Dry run plane tests with full equipment and/or full-dress exercises in the MAT hanger will show what is the proper ratio between weight, bulk and maneuverability. In other words, we leave the problem of how the freight will be packed and dropped up to the field. Two suggestions, however, we offer here. When Col. David Hedinott returned from MAT in February 1951, we noted that the machine pistols for the CAPSTAN team were packed in the parachute bag and therefore not readily available to the jumper. For the CARTHAGE team we suggest the use of leg-holsters attached by straps to the upper leg. Donald A. Grimbale, who is an experienced parachute officer scheduled to arrive at MAT prior to March 10, made this suggestion. He is familiar with this type of holster which was built to accommodate American 30 calibre carbines with folding stocks. The holster, however, is suitable for almost any type of weapon of carbine size and Grimbale claims that Schneiders will fit into it. If the parachute bag on the front of the jumper can be worn without fouling the chute, certainly such a holster is no more dangerous. Grimbale is in charge of procuring these holsters. The second suggestion is that CARTHAGE 3 pass judgment on the amounts and types of freight to be sent since he, more than any one else in the operation, has a realistic appreciation of what is wanted. This does not mean that he should pass judgment on the packing.

#### Communication

7. Before the first normal CARTHAGE drop team leaves, it will be our duty to ingress several important points upon the leaders of that team.

a. First of all, w/t is a semi-emergency type of communication as long as only one or two stations are working with LINGER. While w/t is the most rapid and efficient method for conveying important information, the existence of w/t contact will not obviate the need for further east-to-west courier operations in 1951, the use of the regular mails for a/w and innocent text messages, the actual transportation out of the Ukraine of material, reports and personnel which are too bulky or completely unsuitable for transmission by radio, and further air operations. W/t communication is unquestionably the best channel for coordinating and improving upon other means of communication and for sending important brief reports. Therefore, as we have seen in the



CAPSTAN operation, however essential it may be, radio communication in a peace time situation will in its initial stages be only able to provide OGIVE with an infinitesimal fraction of the total intelligence available to the Ukrainian underground. Remember, however, that the most important message which any radio station inside the USSR can send will be advance warning of Soviet plans to start all-out warfare. But it is equally obvious that the current copies of Soviet pasports and other documents and items which we so urgently require before we can mount any significant number of singeton operations must be exfiltrated by overland courier and/or air pick-up.

b. The second important point is this. If we can judge from our somewhat parallel experience with the CAPSTAN, a maximum average of five successful radio contacts per month is all that can be reasonably expected from this operation in spring and early summer 1951. The initial traffic from the Ukraine must be limited in the main to priority operational planning, more specifically to communications planning so that the compromise or capture of our initial active radio station with all equipment and personnel will not constitute a complete communications set-back.

c. The third point that must be impressed indelibly upon the team members' memories is the necessity for the proper use of compromise signals.

d. The fourth important fact that the radio men must remember is that LIMBER will come up at every scheduled contact time, unless the radio operator in the Ukraine has QRL'd to another time. It is reassuring for the operator to know that the base station will always be there.

e. The fifth important point is that the minimum essential messages required in initial radio traffic from the Ukraine can be worked out before the couriers leave. The following are considered at headquarters to be the basic essential messages:

- i. At the earliest time within the first two weeks post-landing consonant with good security the team must give a post-landing situation report including very brief comments on the status of personnel and equipment, any indications of how long it will take to get contact with CAMPORE headquarters, exact spot (coordinates and description) where any communications equipment has been buried, and sign off for an estimated number of days or hours.
- ii. Message indicating contact with headquarters and authenticators from CAMPORE plus "yes" or "no" evaluation by CAMPORE of suitability of pre-arranged emergency supply drop plan, plus any other strictly operational comments CAMPORE has.
- iii. Brief answers or comments keyed to the political, operational and intelligence points we have sent in with the couriers.

The briefer these first messages can be made without losing their meaning, the better. The case officer and the cipher instructor in the field should work

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out simple methods of cutting down the number of code groups used. For instance, the message giving the status of the team members can be quite brief. Each man can be assigned a one-digit number. A different letter of the alphabet can be assigned to each of the following meanings: healthy, incapacitated (i.e. cannot travel on foot), dead. Thus for a gloomy example, part of the first message could read: "1, 2 H. 3I. 4D," i.e. "CARTHAGE 9 and CASSOWARY 5 healthy; CARTHAGE 5 incapacitated; CARTHAGE 13 dead." Many of the briefing points can be phrased so that initially only a "yes" or "no" answer is required. Proper use of punctuation is also very important if ambiguity in the cables is to be avoided. Abbreviations must also be punctuated unless they are those organizational abbreviations we already know. We assume that the composition of brief situation report cables will be part of the operators pre-dispatch training.

f. The sixth important point involves the expansion of w/t facilities. Once one agent station has gone into operation inside the Ukraine, we have, as mentioned above, a tenuous semi-emergency communications strand the weakest point of which is the security of the agent operator(s) and the set itself. We do not know much to-date concerning Soviet DFing ability. We are advising our operators, however, to keep their sets as mobile as possible, to operate for the time being in the western mountains and to post guards while the station is set up. Naturally, at least 90% of the contacts scheduled on the signal plan should be scheduled so that they take place after darkness has arrived in the Ukraine. In spite of all these precautions, the fruits of two years work will depend on the safety of the operators and equipment at one station as long as only one station is active. When, however, we have activated two or more agent sets in the Ukraine, both working through LINDER, we have more than doubled chances for stable radio contact. Theoretically, of course, if two sets are sent in with the first team this spring, plus three or four operators, one set can be buried and the operators can be dispersed so that should our first station collapse or be captured, the buried radio set will be dug up and a second station activated as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the one-at-a-time system does not change the fact that at any given time the continuity and possibly the survival of radio communications is dependant on the security of one active station. The CAPSTAN operation offers a cogent example of the vulnerability of a net which has but one outstation. As soon as two or more stations are active, however, all agent sets would have to be knocked out by the Soviets before w/t contact with LINDER ceased to exist. If by fall 1951 we can send in enough sets and operators for at least three, separate, active radio stations in the Western Ukraine, the chances of retaining radio contact through the winter and into the spring of 1952 will be greatly increased. If, for an example, we have one station active in Lvov Oblast, one in Drozhobych Oblast and one in the Stanislaw area, we will have created a "star net." (Sternverbindung is a German term almost without an English equivalent. The term describes a radio net which has a plurality of outstations working exclusively to and through the same base station.) Such a "star net" will have decided advantages for the underground since the station in Lvov Oblast can send messages to the station in Stanislaw or Drozhobych through LINDER and vice versa. All stations will have different sets of encode and decode pads and signal plans so that the message from Lvov area to Stanislaw would be sent first to the base station, decoded, and re-encoded in the proper code for the Stanislaw station. This

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is the only type of internal w/t communication which we can permit the Ukrainian underground to have as long as our radio nets and operators trained by us are used, for our basic control factor in this operation must remain that of absolute in the field of w/t communication. If our operators do not understand the security logic of the "star net" sufficiently to be able to explain that logic to their underground superiors in the Ukraine, it is not advisable to consider setting up such a net. A breach of "star net" procedure involving direct transmissions between two outstations cannot be tolerated. There is no emergency which outweighs communications security in a "star net." There are two more important advantages to a "star net" aside from the fact that it is more difficult to knock out. If, for example, the Dvoboyan Chlaxet station goes off the air without explanation or seems to be compromised, a warning can be sent to the other outstation(s) which can initiate an investigation through CAMPDEN and report back the findings to the base station. The second important factor is that once a plurality of stations are on the air, a great number of intelligence agents and reports can be received and operational communications with CAMPDEN will be easier to coordinate.

#### Briefing the Next Team

3. General Principles: If the capture of CANNON 8 has taught us anything, it has taught us that we must divide our briefing more evenly between the members of the team so that no crucial phase of the briefing is dependent exclusively on the survival and well-being of one man. So far, our CANNON 8 casualties inside the Ukraine have averaged fifty per cent of each team. The average may be even higher this year. The split briefing system, devised by [redacted], used for imparting the emergency resupply drop information in spring 1950 served its purpose, and a resupply drop in the July 1950 moon period would quite probably have been successful because (a) CANNON 8 was incapable of divulging the whole resupply plan, (b) CANNON 4 and another partisan were waiting during the July moon period at one of the two selected points, and (c) CANNON 4 reported to CANNON 3 in late August that during the moon period of July there was no enemy activity around that drop point. The value of split briefing in this case cannot be questioned or underestimated.

Split briefing allows all members of the team to share more equally the burden of memorization. In the case of the emergency resupply briefing which was split between two pairs of four men in May 1950 (i.e. only CANNON 3 and 8 knew the significance and background of identical numbers CANNON 4 and 5 memorized), we had the added security advantage that the men who had memorized the core of the information in code form did not know the significance of what they had memorized. It would have been well in spring 1950 to apply this method of briefing to other highly-sensitive subjects as well, for the truth of the matter is that CANNON 8 knew too much. Several subjects he memorized could have been split and reassembled only when he started off with a heavy indigenous escort for CAMPDEN headquarters. Safe mailing addresses in and outside the Ukraine, for instance, could have been memorized by CANNON 4 and 5. As it was, CANNON 8 knew about all there was to know

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concerning s/w plans. Many categories of operational briefing can be split among the members of the team.

a. Intelligence Briefings: All the activities of the Ukrainian underground are directly or indirectly operational since the procurement of supplies, the manufacture and distribution of press propaganda, the movement of personnel, the recruitment of personnel, etc., require the same techniques and security precautions which are involved in clandestine intelligence work. Even though they are amateurs in intelligence collection, from the operational point of view, the underground can be regarded as the most highly developed para-intelligence organization so far known to exist in the Soviet Union. It must not be forgotten that operationally the Ukrainian underground has to-date continued to exist in spite of the NKVD and MVD and has destroyed in part the myth of invincibility which those security organs had acquired.

It has been noted in the last two years that the Ukrainian underground personnel we have interrogated are not particularly good observers, intelligence collectors or reports writers. These same deficiencies hold true in the reports that we have received from the Ukrainians. Except in a few isolated subjects to which they are particularly sensitive, members of the Ukrainian underground do not collect and assimilate information of the type we desire. The three sensitive subjects of special interest to the Ukrainian underground include: the special anti-partisan sections of the NKVD and MVD; tactical low-level defensive military intelligence; and the official and unofficial policies vis-a-vis the Ukraine of the USSR, the U.S., Great Britain, Poland, Rumania, Belorussia, and the Caucasian states. On these limited subjects reporting has varied from fair to good. Although we wish to swing the Ukrainian underground away from information targets which do not have a vital importance for us, the process of changing the direction and quality of their intelligence collection efforts is not a simple one. Our present energies had best be spent on training the personnel we dispatch in: (a) observation and description, (b) reports and cable writing, (c) techniques of intelligence collection, (d) debriefing, (e) surveillance, etc. Although they are primarily radio men, they are our only channel for making the underground more sophisticated in intelligence matters. CARTHAGE 3 is being trained in all these subjects in addition to his radio work.

How specific should our intelligence briefing be on priority targets in the Ukraine and elsewhere? After considerable reflection on this problem, the undersigned and Jewett believe that the verbal briefing of the initial courier team should not include specific military and industrial targets, but should include the categories of targets we are interested in, in order of their importance. In the field of operational intelligence we can be more specific for an efficient collector of operational intelligence must know what he is looking for in very explicit terms. Probably the failure of CARTHAGE 3 to bring out samples of current documents resulted from haziness as to exactly what we were interested in. Therefore it should be explained carefully but discreetly to those members of the first team who are being highly briefed why such detailed information on documentation, mail censorship, travel controls, etc. is required.

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b. What types of briefing points should go in with the couriers in writing and what types should be memorized? In general nothing should go in writing which can be efficiently committed to memory unless what is written could not be understood by an unauthorized reader. Abbreviations, symbols, simple codes and any other aids to memory can be used so long as their true meaning is known only to the individual courier. Whatever information on sensitive briefing subjects is written down, be on a "flimsy," i.e. a thin piece of paper such as onion skin which can easily be destroyed either by swallowing, by fire, etc. in case of emergency.

c. In planning who gets what briefing it must be remembered that a record must be kept of what significant items each member of the team knows so that if a member of any future team is caught alive by the Soviets we will have a precise knowledge of what information must be considered compromised. A copy of such a briefing report should be sent to Washington by pouch. The report should include detailed description of exactly how the briefing was split or subdivided and what exactly went into the Ukraine in writing. It is strongly recommended that a tape recording be made of all final briefing sessions so that there can be no doubt in any one's mind in the future exactly what was said, who said it and even in what tone of voice. In addition, contrary to past practice, an American should be present also during the briefing sessions held by the CASPOVARIES. We will send more information on intelligence briefing in the next memorandum.

d. Political Briefing: The undersigned is clearing a brief through PJCase which has a policy interest in the join operation. This political brief will be forwarded to Munich soonest.

e. Operational Briefing:

- i. emergency resupply drop plan (to be worked out in the field)
- ii. any instructions on exfiltration such as safe address in Vienna plus instructions on how to enter the American Sector, etc. (to be worked out in the field)
- iii. special communications instructions (to be worked out in the field in accordance with instructions contained herein and in conjunction with a memorandum on a/v to be sent to you soonest)
- iv. post-landing procedure (to be worked out in the field in collaboration with CARTHAGE 3 and other team leaders)
- v. statement to the underground that we intend to keep at least two teams on deck in training, although we are entirely dependant on recruiting from the emigration and have only very few men recently arrived from the homeland left (the field can enumerate them).
- vi. send out more couriers this summer.

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The field can expand this operational briefing and include whatever other operational points are deemed essential. Please cable any additional major points to Washington for clearance before briefing is given to the couriers.

The Use of Normal Postal Channels

9. In reference to para 6f through i of KGM-A 4883, a discussion of a/w and another type of innocent text code suitable for use in letters to and from CANNPORN is being pouched to you separately. CARTHAGE 3 and [ ] are working on this innocent text code. CARTHAGE 3 has drawn up three sample letters of the type that normally get through mail censorship. We are pouching you the mailing addresses in the Ukraine which CARTHAGE 3 brought out in 1949. CARTHAGE 3 checked with CANNPORN 6 and found these addresses still valid. The use of these addresses is all laid on and therefore they do not need to be given to the first team, if that team already has other addresses. We hope that [ ] is successful in procuring mailing addresses in Czechoslovakia. After CARTHAGE 3's capture it will probably be next to impossible to get letters out to North and South America.

Security

10. A separate memorandum is being prepared on the capture of CARTHAGE 3 plus the significance of his capture for future operations. In the interim we suggest that the field change the security pattern of the drop preparations wherever feasible. We must assume that the comings and goings of CASSOWARY 4, 6 and the case officers who travel back and forth from HAF to Munich are under surveillance. The same comment applies to [ ] [ ] [ ] will discuss these points further upon his arrival in Munich.

Informing Headquarters of the Exact Day of Dispatch

11. Were it not for the bare, outside chance that headquarters might receive some last minute information dictating a change in drop date or route, there would be no compelling reason to inform Washington of the drop until it had been completed. For additional security, please refer by cable only to this paragraph when giving cable notification of the date selected.

12. CASSOWARY 3 was quite impressed by the thoroughness with which last August's team was prepared for their mission. He has been pleased to note that each time an air drop is mounted there has been progressively more attention paid to detail. [ ] [ ] , he added, deserves the credit.

[ ] [ ] [ ]

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RICHARD HELMS

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